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Strict Products Liability:
Giving Content to the Term
"Defect" in Design Cases
Courts have long wrestled with the meaning of the term "defect" in
strict products liability actions, especially those in which the design of the
product is allegedly defective. New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Francis
once stated with respect to the meaning of defect: "Suffice it to say the
concept is a broad one. The range of its operation must be developed as the
problems arise and by courts mindful that the public interest demands
consumer protection."' The California Supreme Court in Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co.2 set forth two standards for determining whether a
product that causes injury is defectively designed. First, the court held that
a product may be found defective in design if it fails to perform as safely as
an ordinary consumer would expect.3 Second, the court held that a
product may be found defective in design if the risk of danger inherent in
the challenged design outweighs the benefits of the design.4 This Case
Comment will examine the doctrine of strict products liability in
California and analyze the Barker standards for design defects. The
analysis will focus on Barker's relationship to California's strict products
liability theory and policy, and will conclude that the decision is generally
consistent with California precedent.
I. THE ORIGINS OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Theoretical Foundations
The origins of strict products liability in California may be traced to
the 1944 case of Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.5 Concurring in that
decision, California Supreme Court Justice Traynor urged the court to do
away with negligence and the fictions of warranty theory, both
characteristic of existing products liability decisions. 6 He suggested that
the court instead adopt a theory of absolute liability.7 It was not until 1963
that Justice Traynor, writing for a unanimous court, pronounced the rule
of strict products liability in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.:s "A
1. Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 67, 207 A.2d 305, 313 (1965).
2. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 CaL Rptr. 225 (1978). See also Cepeda v. Cumberland
Eng'r Co., 76 NJ. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978). For a discussion of the doctrine in Ohio, see Note, 77e
Coming of Age of Strict Products Liability in Ohio, 39 Onto ST. LJ. 586 (1978).
3. 20 Cal. 3d at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236; see text accompanying notes 62-64
infra.
4. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236; see text accompanying notes 65-67
infra.
5. 24 CaL-2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440.
7. Id.
8. 59 CaL 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." 9 This oft-quoted
phrase is sometimes referred to as the Greenman rule.
In 1965, section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was
published in its final form. This section states in part: "One who sells any
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous . .. is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused . . . ." Strict products
liability is not the absolute liability urged by Justice Traynor in Escola. The
requirement of a defect, imposed by both the Greenman rule and the
Restatement, distinguishes strict products liability from absolute liability.
Under the theory of absolute liability, a manufacturer or seller would be
subject to liability whenever an injury was caused by a product,
irrespective of the presence of a defect. The defectiveness requirement in
strict products liability limits liability so that a manufacturer or seller does
not become an unlimited insurer of the product."
Although initially the Greenman rule and the Restatement were often
thought to be interchangeable, 12 a subsequent California decision drew a
significant distinction between the two. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
the California Supreme Court held that the plaintiffdoes not have to prove
that the product is "unreasonably dangerous" in order to recover in strict
products liability." This language had been employed in several California14 114
decisions and is part of Restatement section 402A.15 The first reasongiven by the Cronin court for not requiring proof that the product is
9. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) reads in full-
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Comment g states that a product is in a defective condition if it is "at the time it leaves the seller's
hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him." Comment i states that in order to be unreasonably dangerous, the product "must be
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer ...."
11. See Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d ,143, 456-57, 143 Cal. Rptr,
225, 238-39 (1978).
12. See, e.g., Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 384,482 P.2d 681, 684,93 Cal.
Rptr. 769,772 (1971); Pike v. Frank C. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465,475,467 P.2d 229,236,85 Cal, Rptr,
629, 636 (1970).
13. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 123, 501 P.2d 1153, 1155, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 435 (1972).
14. E.g., Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 384,482 P.2d 681,684,93 Cal. Rptr.
769, 772(1971); Pike v. Frank C. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465,475,467 P.2d 229,236,85 Cal. Rptr, 629,
636 (1970).
15. Text set forth at note 10 supra.
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unreasonably dangerous was that the term "rings of negligence."' 6 One of
the purposes of the strict products liability action is to avoid burdening the
plaintiff with the necessity of proving negligence.1 7 Second, the court
objected to a requirement that burdened the plaintiffwith proving that the
product was both defective and unreasonably dangerous. 8 The court did
not, however, disapprove of the primary purpose for which the language
was included in the Restatement formulation: to assure that normally
harmless but potentially dangerous products-for example, sugar, butter,
and liquor-do not give rise to strict products liability.19
B. Policy Foundations
The foremost policy underlying the doctrine of strict products liability
in California was stated by Justice Traynor in Greenman: "The purpose of
such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves., 20 The court in Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. noted: "[lit
has been suggested that liability might be imposed as to products whose
norm is danger."2' Extending this rationale of risk allocation, liability
could conceivably be expanded to include harm resulting from inherently
dangerous characteristics of good products, such as injuries caused by a
polio vaccine or by the Pasteur rabies treatment.22
Another reason for adopting strict products liability is to relieve an
injured person of the burden of proving negligence. 23 Easing the plaintiff's
burden of proof is essentially a means of achieving the broader policy of
risk allocation. A person will be subject to liability for negligence if he fails
to exercise reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risk of harm.24 To prove
that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable, the plaintiff must show the
possibility and gravity of harm outweighed the usefulness of the product,
and that a reasonable man in the position of the defendant knew or should
16. 8 Cal 3d at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
17. Id. at 133,501 P.2d at 1162,104 Cal. Rptr. at442. Seegenerallytextaccompanyingnotes23-
26 infra.
18. 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i (1965); The Supreme Court of
California: 1971-1972, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 656, 659 (1973).
20. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63,377 P.2d 897, 901,27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 701 (1963). Nearly two decades earlier, in calling for absolute liability, JusticeTraynor had said:
"The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person
injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed
among the public as a cost of doing business." Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,462,
150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
21. 4 Cal. 3d 379,383,482 P.2d 68I,684,93 Cal. Rptr. 769,772(1971) (citingTraynor, The Mays
and Means of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 367-69 (1965)).
22. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S U. 30, 33 (1973).
23. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,133,501 P.2d 1153,1162,104 Cal. Rptr.433,442
(1972).
24. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971).
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have known of the risk of harm when the product was sold.25 In a suit based
on negligence, the plaintiff may have difficulty proving that: (1) a particular
defendant was responsible for creating the risk of harm; or (2) the risk of
harm could have been discovered by proper inspection; or (3) a specific act
or omission caused the risk of harm.26 Allowing recovery in strict products
liability eases the injured person's burden of proof by focusing on the
product defect and not the defendant's conduct.
A further policy underpinning strict products liability is the potential
reduction of harm caused by defective products. 27 It may be argued that
since the manufacturer's potential liability is greater in strict products
liability than it is in negligence, the manufacturer will produce a product
28that is safer for the consumer. Some commentators, however, have
expressed doubt whether strict products liability actually induces greater
care than does liability for negligence.2 9 Even if it does incite greater
concern for safety, it may also tend to inhibit the development of new
products, such as beneficial drugs.30
The final policy suggested by Justice Traynor in Escola is the
avoidance of circuitous litigation. In an action for breach of a sales
warranty, the retailer is subject to liability to the purchaser without regard
to fault. Indemnity can be recovered along the chain of supply so that the
manufacturer eventually pays the costs for the injury. Allowing the injured
purchaser to recover directly from the manufacturer in strict products
liability avoids burdening the parties and the courts with numerous suits.3
1
Although a variety of policy goals may justify the imposition of strict
products liability in a given case, the courts in California have consistently
emphasized the goal of risk allocation. One way the courts have tried to
achieve this goal is by easing the plaintiff's burden of proof. Risk alloca-
tion is an attempt to ensure that the party best able to absorb the loss will
be held liable. The imposition of strict products liability may also have an
incidental effect of improving product safety.
C. The Defect Requirement
There are at least three general classifications of product defects.
25. Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICnh L,
REV. 1329, 1336 (1966).
26. Note, Abnormal Use in the Strict Products Liability Case--The Plaintff's Burden of
Proof?, 6 Sw. L. REV. 661, 668-69 (1974).
27. In Escola, Justice Traynor suggested this rationale: "It is to the public interest to discourage
the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public." Flscola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurxing).
28. Hoenig, Product Design and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a .Better Approach?, 8 SW. L.
REV. 109, 131 (1976).
29. Keeton, supra note 22, at 34; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1119 (1960).
30. Keeton, supra note 22, at 34.
31. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,464, 150 P.2d 436,442 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring); Prosser, supra note 29, at 1123-24.
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First, a product may contain a "manufacturing defect" when it differs from
the intended result of the manufacturer or seller at the time of sale.32 A
typical example would be a machine that fails to comply with the
manufacturer's own specifications.33 These cases generally concern an
isolated error in the manufacture or inspection of the product.
A defect can also arise when a manufacturer or seller gives inadequate
warning or instructions about either the risk involved in the use of the
product or how to minimize the harmful consequences from such risks. 34
These cases are generally discussed under the rubric of "failure to warn,"
though at least one commentator has suggested that they are properly
classified as design defects.35 Typically these cases concern beneficial
drugs, although an early California decision dealt with inadequate
warning about the safe use of dynamite.36
Finally, a product may be found to have a"design defect" if the design
of the product causes injury to a human being.37 Automobiles are perhaps
the subject of the best known cases dealing with design defects. 3S Since the
entire product line is being challenged in a design defect case, the potential
economic consequences of an unfavorable decision to the manufacturer
are generally much greater than in a suit based on an isolated
manufacturing defect.
The question naturally arises how courts are to decide when a product
is defective. Dean Wade, in an article frequently cited as authority in
Barker, has suggested that manufacturing defect cases be treated under
principles of strict products liability and that design defect or inadequate
warning cases be resolved under "negligence techniques.' 39 Another
commentator has also urged that Restatement section 402A be limited to
cases concerning defects in the manufacturing process. 40 Dean Keeton has
suggested that in design defect cases, courts should decide"whether or not
negligence is or is not a prerequisite to recovery.' 41 In order to understand
32. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,236
(1978); Keeton, supra note 22, at 33.
33. See, e.g., Lewis v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 20 CaL App. 3d 570.97 Cal. Rptr. 798
(1971).
34. Keeton, supra note 22, at 34.
35. Twerski, From Defect to cause to Comiparaliie Fault-RethinkingSoze Product Liability
Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297, 303 (1977).
36. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 CaL Rptr. 552 (1965).
37. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62,377 P.2d 897, 900,27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 700 (1963); Keeton, supra note 22, at 33-34.
38. See, e.g., Heap v. General Motors Corp., 66 Cal. App. 3d 824, 136 Cal Rptr. 304(1977); Self
v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974).
39. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L. 825,837 (1973).
40. Hoenig, supra note 28, at 137.
41. Keeton, supra note 22, at 39. In an earlier article, however, he suggested that the term
"defect" be limited to miscarriages in the manufacturing process and that it not be extended to either
design defects or "defects" attributable to false or inadequate information. Keeton, Manufacturer's
Liability: The Meaning of Defect in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACusE L. REV.
556, 562 (1969).
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the two standards for design defects set forth by the court in Barker, it is
necessary to discuss the tests for strict products liability espoused by Deans
Keeton and Wade and to compare these tests with an action for negli-
42gence.
Dean Keeton proposed the following test to identify a defect:
A product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous as marketed. It is
unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable person would conclude that the
magnitude of the scientifically perceivable danger as it is proved to be at the
time of trial outweighed the benefits of the way the product was so designed
and marketed. Under the heading of benefits one would include anything
that gives utility of some kind to the product; one would also include the
infeasibility and additional cost of making a safer product.
43
Dean Wade's test to identify a defect in a product is similar:
Assume that the defendant knew of the dangerous condition of the product
and ask whether he was then negligent in putting it on the market or supplying
it to someone else . . . .Once given this notice of the dangerous condition
of the chattel, the question then becomes whether the defendant was negligent
to people who might be harmed by that condition . . . .Another way of
saying this is to ask whether the magnitude of the risk created by the
dangerous condition of the product was outweighed by the social utility
attained by putting it out in this fashion."
Under both tests the defendant is assumed to know of the dangerous
condition of the product. The question then becomes whether the
defendant acted unreasonably in so marketing the product.4 5 The issue is
"whether the magnitude of the risk created by the dangerous condition of
the product so outweighed the social utility attained by putting it out in
this fashion that a reasonable seller would not have marketed it."
'4 6
The primary difference between the approach advocated by Deans
Keeton and Wade, often called the risk/utility analysis, and common-law
negligence is that under their approach, the plaintiff need not prove that
the defendant knew or should have known of the dangerous condition of
the product at the time of manufacture or sale. 7 As long as the product is
shown to be defective when sold,48 the plaintiff need not prove that the
defendant knew or should have known of the defect.4 9 Additionally, in
42. See also Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
43. Keeton, supra note 22, at 37-38 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted),
44. Wade, supra note 39, at 834-35 (footnotes omitted).
45. The defendant's conduct is theoretically not an issue under the risk/ utility analysis of Deans
Wade and Keeton because the balancing is done at the time of trial. As a practical matter, however, the
jury seems likely to consider the defendant's conduct in design defect cases when assessing evidence of
the infeasibility of making a safer product.
46. Note, Reasonable Product Safety: Giving Content to the Defectiveness Standard in
California Strict Products Liability Cases, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 492, 506 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
47. See Rheingold, What Are Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations?", 22 Bus, LAW, 589
(1967).
48. Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN, L,
REv. 101, 102 (1977).
49. Wade, supra note 39, at 835.
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strict products liability, the plaintiff need not show which of two or more
defendants was responsible for the defect. 50 Furthermore, he need not
prove that the defect could have been discovered, nor the specific act or
omission that caused the defect.5 ' Thus, the focus of analysis in strict
products liability is on the condition of the product and not on the conduct
of the defendant.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING OF
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.
Plaintiff, Ray Barker, sustained serious personal injuries operating a
high-lift loader manufactured by defendant Lull Engineering Co. 52 The
injuries occurred when Barker, who had operated the loader on only a few
occasions, was attempting to lift a load of lumber onto the second story of
a building. The ground on which the loader rested sloped sharply in several
directions. Barker's coworkers saw the load beginning to tip and warned
him to jump. While scrambling away from the loader, Barker was struck
by a piece of falling lumber.53
Barker claimed that his injuries were caused by one or more design
defects of the loader. 5 4 Defendant denied that the loader was defective and
claimed that the injuries resulted from either Barker's lack of skill or his
misuse of the loader.55 Evidence introduced at trial on the alleged design
defects sharply conflicted, and the jury returned a verdict in defendant's
favor.
56
Barker contended on appeal that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury that "strict liability for the defect in design of a product is based on
a finding that the product was unreasonably dangerous for its intended
use . . .7 He argued that this instruction directly conflicted with the
decision of the court in Cronin, therefore mandating reversal of the
50. In a strict products liability action, the plaintiff can sue not only the manufacturer, but also
the wholesaler or distributor and the retail seller, among others. Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265
Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256,391 P.2d
169, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57.377 P.2d 897,27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
51. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
52. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,416-17, 573 P.2d 443,445-46, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
227-28 (1978). The lessor of the loader was also joined as a party defendant. Id.
53. Id. at 419, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
54. Plaintiff alleged the following as defects in the design of the high-lift loader. (a) the lack of
outriggers-mechanical arms-which would have stabilized the loader on uneven terrain; (b) the
absence of a roll bar or seat belts which would have protected plaintiff if the loader rolled over, (c) the
placement of the leveling mechanism of the loader in a position in which it was likely to be inadvertently
bumped; (d) the absence of a "park" position on the transmission of the loader, which would have
precluded the possibility of movement during the lift. Id. at 420-21,573 P.2d at 447-48, 143 Cal. Rptr.
at 229-30.
55. Id. at 420, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229. For a complete discussion of defense in
strict products liability, see Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and
Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93 (1972).
56. 20 Cal. 3d at 422, 573 P.2d at 449, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
57. Id. at 422 n.4, 573 P.2d at 449 n.4, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 231 n.4.
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judgment.58 Defendants contended that the Cronin decision applied only
to manufacturing defects and not to design defects, the issue in the instant
case.
59
The California Supreme Court in Cronin explicitly stated that its
holding applied to both manufacturing and design defects. 60 Reaffirming
this statement, the court in Barker concluded that the jury instruction was
erroneous because it required the plaintiff to prove that the design made
the product unreasonably dangerous, contrary to the holding in Cronin.61
The court then articulated two standards under which the design of a
product may be found defective.
First, the court held: "[A] product may be found defective in design
if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely
as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or rea-
sonably foreseeable manner., 62 The court noted that this first standard
is somewhat analogous to the warranty of fitness and merchantability
under the Uniform Commercial Code.63 Under this standard, which will be
referred to as the consumer expectations standard, circumstantial evidence
may be used to demonstrate the defectiveness of the product.
64
The court also set forth a second standard for determining whether a
product is defective in design. The court held:
[A] product may be found defective in design, even if it satisfies ordinary
consumer expectations, if through hindsight the jury determines that the
product's design embodies "excessive preventable danger," or, in other
words, if the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged
design outweighs the benefits of such design. 5
This standard will be referred to as the risk-benefit standard. Once the
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the injury was proximately
caused by the design of the product, the burden of proof, not merely the
burden of producing evidence, shifts to the defendant, who must prove, in
light of relevant criteria, that the product was not defective. 66 Among the
relevant criteria to be considered by the jury employing this standard, the
court specifically mentioned
the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that
such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative
58. Id. at 422-23, 573 P.2d at 449, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
59. Id. at 423, 573 P.2d at 449, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
60. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,134-35,501 P.2d 1153, 1162-63, 104 Cal. Rptr,
433, 442-43 (1972).
61. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 426, 573 P.2d 443, 151, 143 Cal, Rptr 225, 233
(1978). The court also found the instruction erroneous because it suggested that in evaluating
defectiveness, only, the "intended use" of the product was relevant, rather than its "reasonable
foreseeable use." Id. at 426 n.9, 573 P.2d at 452 n.9, 143 Cal, Rptr. at 234 n.9.
62. Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse
consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result from an
alternative design. 7
III. ANALYSIS OF Barker
The court in Barker established two standards for determining
whether the design of a product that causes injury is defective. In order to
grasp fully Barker's importance, these standards will be separately
examined in light of the tests and policies of past California strict products
liability decisions. The application of these two standards will also be
discussed before considering how courts might interpret Barker in future
cases.
A. The First Standard: Failure to Meet Consumer Expectations
The enunciation of a consumer expectations standard in Barker raises
the question whether this decision retreats from the Greenman court's
arguable choice of a deviation from tle norm test for product defects. The
consumer expectations standard also poses the question whether Barker
reintroduces the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement of the Restate-
ment, rejected by Cronin, into strict products liability in California.
The court in Barker precluded the use of a deviation from the norm
test in design defect cases by articulating two other standards for
determining whether the design of a product is defective. This raises the
possibility that Barker is inconsistent with Greenman, in which the court
arguably employed a deviation from the norm test to find the product
defective. This reading of Greenman is supported primarily by a dictum in
Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 68 It is more likely, however, that the
court in Greenman employed a consumer expectations standard and that
Barker is consistent with Greenman.
The court in Greenman established the doctrine of strict products
liability by stating that a manufacturer. is subject to liability "when an
article he places on the market . . proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being. 69 It is not clear whether Greenman dealt with a
manufacturing defect or a design defect.7 0 Furthermore, it is not readily
67. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
68. 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93 CaL Rptr. 769 (1971).
69. 59 CaL 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
70. There is no language in the opinion clearly stating what type ofdefect was involved. First, the
court did not differentiate between manufacturing and design defects in stating the Greenman rule, the
holding of the case. Rather, the court omitted the use of the terms entirely, probably because it was
more interested in allowing recovery by injured consumers than in delineating the scope of the nascent
doctrine. Second, the court stated: "Plaintiff introduced substantial evidence that his injuries were
caused by defective design and construction of the [lathe]." 59 Cal. 2d at 60,377 P.2d at 399,27 Cal. at
699 (emphasis added). This language by itself does not indicate what type ofdefect the plaintiffwas able
to prove. Summarizing the decision, the court stated: "To establish the manufacturer's liability it was
sufficient that the plaintiff proved that he was injured . . . as a result of a defect in design and
manufacture . . . that made the [lathe] unsafe . . . ." Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at
701 (emphasis added). Read literally, this language seems to indicate the product was defective in
manufacture and defective in design, but, does not support a definite conclusion.
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discernible whether the Greenman court employed a consumer expec-
tations standard or a deviation from the norm test to determine that the
product was defective. In an apparent reference to Greenman, the court in
Jiminez stated: "[A] defective product is viewed as one which fails to match
the quality of most like products, and the manufacturer is then liable for
injuries resulting from deviations from the norm: the lathe did not like
other lathes have a proper fastening device .... ."" The court also noted
that this test does not provide a solution for all cases.72
The problem that sometimes arises in applying the deviation from the
norm test is choosing an appropriate norm against which to measure the
allegedly defective product. In cases concerning manufacturing defects,
the injury-causing product can be compared with the normal output of the
manufacturer or the industry. In design defect cases, however, the entire
product line of a manufacturer is allegedly defective, and selecting a
control group can be more difficult.
73
In Barker the court stated that a "deviation from the norm" test had
not been used in past design defect decisions.74 These decisions, according
to Barker, employed two other standards-the consumer expectations
standard and the risk-benefit standard. 7' By setting forth these two
standards, the court in Barker implied that a deviation from the norm test
is not applicable in design defect cases. The court also categorized
Greenman as an example of the consumer expectations standard.76 This is
in direct contradiction to the dictum in Jiminez intimating that a deviation
from the norm test was used in Greenman. There are three ways to resolve
this potential conflict.
First, Greenman may have concerned a manufacturing defect. If this
is true, the test or standard actually employed in Greenman was not
important for the purposes of the court in Barker. The Barker decision did
not state which test or standard is appropriate for manufacturing defects.
The court merely precluded the use of a deviation from the norm test for
design defects. Barker is not a retreat from Greenman if this interpretation
is correct.
Second, Greenman may be viewed as a design defect case employing a
consumer expectations standard. This is how the court in Barker classified
Greenman.7 Assuming this classification is correct, Barker and Greenman
are consistent and the misleading dictum in Jiminez should be ignored.
Third, Greenman could be interpreted as a design defect decision in
71. Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 383, 482 P.2d 681,684,93 Cal. Rptr. 769,
772 (1971).
72. Id.
73. Note, supra note 46, at 502.
74. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236
(1978).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
77. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
[Vol. 40:209
DESIGN DEFECT LIABILITY
which a deviation from the norm test was employed. If this is true, the
dictum in Jiminez is correct and the use of Greenman in Barker is
erroneous. Barker then could be seen as a fallback from Greenman since
Barker disapproved of a deviation from the norm test for design defects.
This fear, however, is probably unfounded. Given the inherent difficulties
of applying a deviation from the norm test to design defects,78 the court in
Barker chose instead a consumer expectations standard. The plaintiff's
burden of proof under a consumer expectations standard is probably no
greater than it is under a deviation from the norm test. Therefore, even if
this interpretation of Greenman is correct, Barker is consistent with the
notion underlying Greenman of keeping the plaintiff's burden of proof to a
minimum.
Another important issue raised by Barker is whether the first standard
reintroduces the "unreasonably dangerous" element that the court had
tried to purge from strict products liability theory in Cronin. The court
held in Cronin that the plaintiff need not prove that the product was
unreasonably dangerous. 79 The Restatement definition of the term is:
"[T]he article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer . . .,,So Both the
Restatement definition of unreasonably dangerous and the first standard
set forth in Barker are based on the expectations of the ordinary consumer.
The consumer expectations test established by the Restatement, however,
is more difficult for the plaintiff to meet than the first standard of
Barker.8' Under the Restatement definition of unreasonably dangerous,
the plaintiff must at a minimum prove that the product was more danger-
ous than the ordinary consumer would expect. Under the first standard set
forth in Barker, however, the plaintiff need only prove that the ordinary
consumer would expect the product to be safer. One commentator has
stated: "[T]here appears to be no significant difference between a standard
based on proof of defect and one based on unreasonable danger, where
both are defined in terms of the ordinary expectations of the average
consumer."82 To the extent that both Barker and the Restatement are
based on ordinary consumer expectations, the first standard in Barker
arguably reintroduces the element of unreasonable danger rejected by
Cronin.
This argument, however, has no merit. The Cronin court's rejection of
the consumer expectations test by which the Restatement defines the term
unreasonably dangerous "was based . . . on a substantive determination
that the Restatement's [consumer expectations test] represented an undue
78. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 13-19 supra.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i (1965).
81. See Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,425-26 n.7, 573 P.2d 443,451 n.7,143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 233 n.7 (1978).
82. Phillips, supra note 48, at 102 (footnotes omitted).
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restriction on the application of strict liability principles. 83 The court in
Cronin disapproved the consumer expectations test of the Restatement
because the test was too difficult for the plaintiff to meet.8 4 The court did
not reject the use of a consumer expectations standard in all cases, but only
when such a standard unduly burdens the plaintiff. The consumer
expectations standard articulated in Barker does not excessively burden
the plaintiff and is consistent with Cronin.
B. The Second Standard: Risk Balanced With Benefits
Arguably, the risk-benefit standard set out in Barker for determining
whether the design of a product is defective, although employing a
different linguistic formula, is essentially the risk/utility analysis
advocated by Deans Keeton and Wade. Dean Keeton said that the
balancing is done at the time of trial;85 the Barker court said the test is one
of hindsight.8 6 Dean Wade asked whether the magnitude of the risk
outweighed the social utility of the product;87 in Barker, the question is
whether the risk inherent in the challenged design outweighs the benefits of
such design.88 The relevant criteria that the court in Barker suggested for
jury consideration are also quite similar to those suggested by Dean
Wade.89
The most obvious difference between the Wade/ Keeton approach
and the risk-benefit standard adopted in Barker is the allocation of the
burden of proof. Under the Barker approach, the defendant must prove
that the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the inherent risk of
83. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 425, 573 P.2d 443, 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 233
(1978).
84. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132-33, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-62, 104 CAl,
Rptr. 433, 441-42 (1972); Barkerv. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,425-26, 573 P.2d 443,451, 143 Cal,
Rptr. 225, 233 (1978).
85. Keeton, supra note 22, at 38.
86. 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
87. Wade, supra note 39, at 834.
88. 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 473 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
89. Compare the criteria mentioned in text accompanying note 67 supra with the following
suggested by Dean Wade:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the public as
a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the
probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as
unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or
of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss bysetting the price
of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, supra note 39, at 837-38 (footnotes omitted).
DESIGN DEFECT LIABILITY
danger. Under the approach of Deans Wade and Keeton, theplaintiffmust
prove that the risk created by the product outweighs its social utility.
Another seeming distinction between the Wade/Keeton approach
and the risk-benefit standard set forth in Barker is the use or absence of the
terms "reasonable" and "unreasonable." Under the risk/utility analysis
advocated by Deans Wade and Keeton, the first question is whether the
product is defective-that is, whether the risk outweighs the utility. If the
product is found to be defective, the question then becomes whether the
defendant acted unreasonably in marketing it. The primary emphasis,
therefore, is on the condition of the product, and only secondarily does the
trier of fact consider the conduct of the defendant.90 Under the Barker
approach, however, the jury determines only whether the risk of danger
inherent in the challenged design outweighs the benefits of such design. No
question of reasonableness arises.91
There are at least two possible reasons why the Barker court eschewed
the use of the terms "reasonable" and "unreasonable" in the risk-benefit
standard. First, in Cronin the court flatly rejected the use of the term
"unreasonably dangerous" in strict products liability cases. 92 Second, had
the court employed the term "reasonable," the focus of thejury might have
been on the conduct of the defendant rather than on the condition of the
product. This might make negligence a prerequisite to recovery.93 The
court indicated several times that "in a strict liability case, as contrasted
with a negligent design action, the jury's focus is properly directed to the
condition of the product itself, and not to the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's conduct.
94
Arguably, however, the term "reasonable" is implicit in the court's
risk-benefit standard. If thejury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the
challenged design outweighs the benefits of such design, is it not the same
as finding that the product is in an unreasonable condition? If the two are
the same, the inquiry could easily be put in terms of the defendant's
conduct rather than as a characterization of the product: assuming the
defendant had knowledge of the unreasonable condition of the product
(the design defect), would he then have been acting unreasonably in
placing it on the market?9
5
90. Note, supra note 46, at 507.
91. The terms "reasonable" and "unreasonable" are used in this Case Comment in two different
contexts. First, with respect to the product, if the trier of fact determines that the risks outweigh the
benefits or social utility, the product, in the opinion of this writer, is in an "unreasonable condition."
The term "reasonable" is also used when considering the conduct of the defendant. Reasonable
conduct is that which society seeks to encourage, and unreasonable conduct is thatwhich societyseeks
to discourage by subjecting the defendant to liability.
92. Croninv. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.433 (1972); seetext
accompanying notes 13-19 supra.
93. Note, supra note 46, at 516-17.
94. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 434, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,239
(1978); see id. at 418, 432, 573 P.2d at 447, 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229, 238.
95. Welsh v. Outboard Motor Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973); Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965).
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The court in Barker may have relied on a negligence discussion in an
appellate decision as an example of a previous California strict products
liability case employing a balancing approach. Of the three cases cited as
authority by the court in Barker for the risk-benefit standard,96 only in
Hyman v. Gordon did the court clearly articulate a balancing test: "It was
for the jury to balance the likelihood of harm and the gravity of harm as
opposed to the burden of precaution which would effectively have avoided
it."'97 In support of this proposition, the court in Hyman cited Pike v.
Frank G. Hough Co.,98 apparently relying on that court's discussion of
negligent design, not of strict products liability. 9'' The Barker court's
reliance on Hyman, which in turn relied on Pike, is quite questionable.
On behalf of the plaintiff in Barker, amicus California Trial Lawyer
Association (CTLA) contended that a standard directing the jury to weigh
or balance a number of competing considerations is inconsistent with
Cronin because it "rings of negligence."100 The court gave three reasons for
dismissing the CTLA's contention. First, the court said that by shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant to show that the design is not defective,
the risk-benefit standard lightens the plaintiff's burden of proof in
conformity with Greenman and Cronin.'01 Second, the court felt that it is
impossible to eliminate the weighing of a number of considerations in
determining whether the design of a product is defective. 0 2 Third, in strict
products liability, unlike negligence, the jury focuses on the condition of
the product, not on the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct' 03
It has been argued in this Case Comment that when the jury renders a
verdict for the plaintiff because the risk inherent in -the challenged design
outweighs the benefits of such design, 0 4 the clear import of the verdict is
that the product is in an unreasonable condition.'0 5 Any difference
between the terms "unreasonable condition" and "unreasonably
dangerous"- the term rejected by the Cronin court--is likely to be one of
96. Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 547, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605, 613-14
(1976); Selfv. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575,578 (1974); Hyman v.
Gordon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 769, 773, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264-65 (1973).
97. Hyman v. Gordon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 769, 775, 111 Cal. Rptr 262, 265 (1973),
98. 2 Cal. 3d 465, 470, 467 P.2d 229, 232, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 632 (1970). The court also cited
Thompson v. Package Mach. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 188, 196,99 Cal. Rptr. 281,286 (1971), although it Is
not clear why.
99. Note, supra note 46, at 513.
100. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 2d 413, 433, 573 P.2d 443,456, 143 Cal, Rptr. 225, 238
(1978) (quoting Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,133, 501 P.2d 1153,1142,104 Cal, Rptr.
433, 442 (1972)).
101. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 433, 573 P.2d 443, 456, 143 Cal, Rptr. 225, 238
(1978).
102. Id. at 433-34, 573 P.2d at 456-57, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238-39.
103. Id. at 434, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
104. This argument assumes that thejury also finds that defective design proximately caused the
plaintiff's injuries.
105. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
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semantics and not of substance. The risk-benefit standard articulated in
Barker may have brought back the unreasonably dangerous element that
the Cronin decision tried to purge from the strict products liability action.
C. Application of the Two Standards
There are at least two possible ways to apply the standards articulated
by the court in Barker. One approach is to view the two standards as
independent, alternative tests for determining whether the design of a
product is defective. 106 The other approach is to view the two standards as
separate prongs of the same test for design defects. t 7 Both of these
approaches will be discussed and reasons set forth for preferring a single,
two-pronged test to two alternative tests.
It may be argued that the court in Barker established two independent
alternative tests to determine whether the design of a product is defective.
This argument is supported by language in the opinion: "[A] product may
be foind defective in design .. .under either of two alternative tests."10'
The existence of two tests might also be inferred from the statement: "This
dual standard ... assures an injured plaintiff protection from products
that either fall below ordinary consumer expectations . ..or that, on
balance, are not as safely designed as they should be."'0 9
If the court did establish two independent, alternative tests, a question
that naturally arises is: who chooses the appropriate standard under which
the case will be tried and then submitted to the jury? Under the first
(consumer expectations) standard, theplaintiffhas the burden of proving
that the design is defective. Under the second (risk-benefit) standard, the
defendant has the burden of proving that the design is not defective.
A case could conceivably arise in which the jury, having been
instructed under both standards, finds that (1) the product fails to satisfy
the ordinary consumer expectations of safety in its reasonably foreseeable
use, and (2) the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of
danger inherent in such design. In other words, the plaintiff has met his
burden of proof under the consumer expectations standard, and the
defendant has met his under the risk-benefit standard. This problem,
however, only arises if the two standards set forth in Barker are treated as
two independent, alternative tests.
One way to resolve the dilemma presented by a conflict between the
two tests is to refer to the overriding policy of past California strict
products liability decisions-that is, risk allocation. If the plaintiff meets
106. See text accompanying notes 108-09 infra.
107. See text accompanying notes 110-14 infra.
108. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,432, 573 P.2d 443,455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,237
(1978); see id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
109. Id. at418, 573 P.2d at 446-47, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228-29 (emphasisadded);seeid. at418,426-
27, 435, 573 P.2d at 446, 452, 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228, 232, 239-40.
19791
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
his burden of proof under the consumer expectations standard and the
defendant meets his under the risk-benefit standard, the product has been
found defective under one of the two tests. Since the primary policy of
California decisions has been to allocate the cost of injury to the
manufacturer or seller of a defective product, the plaintiff has proved the
first element of an action if the product is found defective under either test,
regardless of the jury's finding under the other test. Hence, when both
parties have met their respective burden of proof, the defendant should still
be subject to liability because the product is defective under the consumer
expectations standard. The fact that the product has been found not to be
defective under the risk-benefit standard should not affect the outcome in
light of the policy of risk allocation.
Although one could argue that the court in Barker created the
potential for a dilemma by establishing two independent alternative tests, a
more logical application of the standards takes the form of a single test
with two separate prongs. t 0 This interpretation, which is supported by
both the language of the Barker opinion and the policies underlying strict
products liability in California, can be stated as follows:
(1) The plaintiff must prove that a product is defective in design because it
fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in
an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.
(a) If the plaintiff meets the burden of proof under this prong,'the
defendant is subject to liability if the design defect proximately caused
injury.
(b) If the plaintiff does not meet the burden of proof under this prong,
only then is the second prong employed.
(2) Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the product
proximately caused injury, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
prove that its product is not defective in design because the benefits of the
design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in the design.
(a) If the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the design of the
product proximately caused injury, the defendant is subject to liability if
he fails to prove that the product is not defective in design as defined in
this prong.
(b) If the plaintiff fails to make a prima facie showing or if the
defendant proves that the product is not defective in design as defined in
this prong, the defendant prevails.
The only language in Barker that gives any support for two separate
tests is the court's reference to "two alternative criteria" and "two
alternative tests."'' The court's use of "either" and "or" when articulating
110. Dean Twerski has suggested the following two-prong test for determining whether a
product is defective:
A products case would be submitted to the jury to determine first, whether the product met
with average consumer expectations; if the answer is negative, defect is established. If the
answer is in the affirmative then plaintiff bears the burden to establish, by utilizing relevant
risk-utility criteria, that the product does not meet societal standards of safety.
Twerski, supra note 35, at 315-16 (footnotes omitted).
11. See note 108 and accompanying text supra.
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the two standards gives definite support to neither position." 2 Language
used throughout the rest of the opinion, however, gives substantial support
to the proposition that the court intended to establish a single test for
design defects with two separate prongs. For example, the court stated:
"iT]he standard permits a manufacturer who has marketed a product
which satisfies ordinary consumer expectations to demonstrate the relative
complexity of design decisions and the trade-offs that are frequently
required in the adoption of alternative designs."'"13 The single-test
interpretation of the two standards articulated in Barker is also given
substantial support later in the opinion in a reference to the holding. The
court stated: "Although past California decisions have not explicitly
articulated the two-prong definition of design defect which we have
elaborated above, other jurisdictions have adopted a somewhat
similar . . . dual approach ....
The argument that the court intended to establish a single test with
two separate prongs is also supported by the policies set forth in past
California strict products liability decisions. The primary goal of these
decisions was to ensure that the seller or manufacturer-not the injured
consumer-would bear the cost of injury resulting from a defective
product. In order to achieve this goal, the court in Cronin sought to confine
the plaintiff's burden of proof in strict products liability to three elements:
(1) defect; (2) proximate causation; and (3) injury. The Barker decision,
read as establishing a single test for design defects, keeps the number of
hurdles between the plaintiff and recovery to a minimum; if the plaintiff
does not prevail under the first prong, he may still prevail under the second
if the defendant fails to exculpate himself.
D. Barker Applied in Future Decisions
There are two issues relating to future application of the Barker
standards. First, it is not clear whether cases of failure to warn will be
treated as design defects or as a separate category. Second, Daly v. General
Motors Corp.,t" 5 a California Supreme Court decision handed down after
Barker, may influence how the lower courts apply the two standards for
design defects.
The first issue is whether cases of failure to warn will be treated under
112. See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
113. Id. at 418, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 432,573 P.3d at456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at238 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).This
argument is also given substantial support by other language in the opinion. First, the court stated that
"at a ninimum a product must meet ordinary consumer expectations as to safety to avoid being found
defective." Id. at 426 n.7, 573 P.2d at 451 n.7, 143 Cal. Rptr. 233 n.7 (emphasis in original). This
statement implies that the other (risk-benefit) standard is part of a single test, rather than an
independent test, for determining whether the design is defective. See id. at 430.573 P.2d at 454, 143
Cal. Rptr. at 236. Second, throughout a paragraph discussing the rationale and limits ofstrict products
liability, the court refers to "the test for defective design." Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 CaL Rptr. at
238 (emphasis added).
115. 20 CaL 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 CaL Rptr. 380 (1978).
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the standards articulated in Barker for design defects. The court in Barker
stated that in cases concerning manufacturing defects, the meaning of the
term "defect" would require little or no elaboration." 6 The court then
said: "[I]n other instances, as when a product is claimed to be defective
because of an unsafe design or an inadequate warning the contours of the
defect concept may not be self-evident."'" 7 In those cases, the trial judge
may have to instruct the jury respecting the legal meaning of the term
"defect."1
18
Later in the opinion, the court again suggested that three sorts of
products may be found defective: products that deviate from the
manufacturer's intended result; products that are unsafe because of a
design defect; and products that are dangerous because they lack adequate
warnings or instructions." 9 In drafting jury instructions defining the term
"defect," trial and appellate courts should "consider prior authorities
involving similar defective product claims.' 120 After reaching this point in
the decision, however, the Barker court totally ignored the cases of failure
to warn.
The court stated: "[T]he concept of defect raises considerably more
difficulties in the design defect context than it does in the manufacturing or
production defect context.' 12' This statement suggests that there are only
two situations in which a product may be found def'ective for purposes of
strict products liability. At least one commentator has argued that cases
concerning inadequate warnings or instructions are merely a subclass of
design defect cases since the products are in the condition intended by the
manufacturer. 22 Whether this is the position of the California Supreme
Court or whether cases of failure to warn constitute a category separate
from design defects is not apparent from the Barker opinion.
The second issue is how the two standards will be applied in light of a
major decision of the California Supreme Court handed down after
Barker. This decision, Daly v. General Motors Corp., may be indicative
of a shift in policy away from risk allocation to a greater concern for the
potential liability of defendants in strict products liability actions. A
thorough analysis of Daly is beyond the scope of this Case Comment.
Read broadly, Daly holds that principles of comparative fault will be
employed in strict products liability actions. This raises the possibility that
contributory negligence will become a defense assertable in strict products
liability actions to reduce the plaintiff's recovery. Prior to Daly,
116. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,417, 573 P.2d 443, 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 228
(1978).
117. Id. at 417-18, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
118. Id. at 418, 573 P.2d at 448, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
119. Id. at 428, 573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
120. Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
121. Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 453-54, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36.
122. Twerski, supra note 35, at 303.
123. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
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contributory negligence was not a defense in strict products liability
actions.1
24
Daly does not deal directly with the standards for design defects
articulated in Barker. Daly could nevertheless have an indirect effect on
these standards if it is read broadly-which is likely-and Barker is read as
establishing two alternative tests-which is unlikely.2 5 The indirect effect
would be limited to the case in which the plaintiff shows that the product
failed to meet consumer expectations of safety and the defendant shows
the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the inherent risk. In this
limited situation, a court might conclude that, in light of the probable
policy shift indicated by Daly, the defendant should not be subject to
liability.
The narrow holding in Daly was that implied assumption of risk, to
the extent that it is a form of contributory negligence, will be dealt with
under principles of comparative fault. If the decision is read this narrowly,
which seems unlikely, Daly is a continuation of the past pro-plaintiff strict
products liability cases- and does not indicate a shift away from the
established California policy of risk allocation. Before Daly, unreasonable
assumption of risk was an absolute bar to recovery; after Daly, such
implied assumption of risk will merely reduce the plaintiff's recovery.
Read in this manner, Daly would have no effect on the Barker decision
should courts interpret Barker as establishing two separate tests for design
defects.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court in Barker articulated two standards for determining
whether the design of a product is defective. The consumer expectations
standard is consistent with the court's decision in Greenman and Cronin.
The risk-benefit standard is derived from the risk/ utility analysis proposed
by Deans Keeton and Wade; there is scant precedent in California strict
products liability decisions for the approach. The second standard could
be viewed as a retreat from Cronin because it injects a balancing approach
into strict products liability theory.
Justice Francis was correct in asserting that courts must deal with the
scope of the term "defect" as problems arise.126 The California courts must
now determine how to apply the two design defect standards established in
Barker. They must also decide how to treat cases of failure to warn and the
role of comparative fault in strict products liability litigation. The concept
124. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
125. In reference to the Barker decision, Justice Jefferson, assigned by the Chairperson of the
Judicial Council, specifically referred to the "two-prong test for determining the existence of a [design
defect]." Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725,754,575 P.2d 1162. 1179, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
397 (1978) (Jefferson, J., concurring and dissenting). This comment makes it even more unlikely that
Barker will be interpreted as establishing two separate tests.
126. Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ. 52, 67,207 A.2d 305,313 (1965); see text
accompanying note 1.
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of defect is indeed "a broad one."' 27 Nevertheless, in Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co. the California Supreme Court gave substance to that
concept for a major portion of strict products liability cases-those in
which the design of the product is allegedly defective.
Thomas Glenn Opferman
127. Id.
